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SOUT	ED STATES DISTRICT COURT HERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
IN R	E: MUNICIPAL DERIVATIVES TRUST LITIGATION	08 CV 2516 (VM)
		00 CV 2310 (VM)
	х	
		New York, N.Y. November 23, 2011 9:34 a.m.
Befo	re:	
	HON. VICTOR MA	ARRERO,
		District Judge
	APPEARANC:	
IIA IIC	EELD LID	
HAUSFELD LLP Attorneys for Plaintiffs Mississippi, Bucks County, et al. BY: HILARY K. SCHERRER		
	-and- AN GODFREY LLP SETH ARD	
SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP Attorneys for Defendant Morgan Stanley BY: SHEPARD GOLDFEIN PAUL M. ECKLES NICHOLAS DANELLA		
COOK, HALL & LAMPROS Attorneys for Plaintiff State of West Virginia BY: CHRIS HALL (by telephone)		
COTC	HETT PITRE & MCCARTHY	
Attorneys for Plaintiff City of Los Angeles BY: DANIEL STERRETT (by telephone)		f Los Angeles

(In open court)

THE COURT: This is a proceeding in the matter of Municipal Derivatives Antitrust Litigation, docket No. 08 Civil 2516, and it is one of the cases transferred to this Court by the multidistrict litigation panel under MDL No. 1950.

The Court scheduled this proceeding in order to consider the application of the parties for an order and final judgment settling the claims of one of the group of plaintiffs with one of the defendants, Morgan Stanley. Previously by order dated October 6 of this year, 2011, the Court had approved an order granting the plaintiffs' counsel, lead counsel, fees and costs of this litigation.

So, this proceeding will be to create the record necessary for the Court to make its findings under appropriate case law that the settlement proposed of this class action is fair and reasonable in light of all of the factors set forth by the Second Circuit in the applicable case law, specifically that the settlement is justified in light of the complexity of the case, the issues that were considered, the likelihood of further litigation and implications of any such litigation, and the other factors that go into a determination that this settlement is fair and reasonable to the class and would support a finding by the Court as a matter of fact.

For the plaintiffs, who speaks, Ms. Scherrer?

MS. SCHERRER: Good morning, your Honor. Hilary

Scherrer from Hausfeld LLP for the class plaintiffs. I'm happy to go through the *Grinnell* factors. I'm prepared to do that or if your Honor wants to truncate this with any questions, we can.

THE COURT: Just go through the factors briefly.

MS. SCHERRER: Okay. As you know, we're here today seeking approval of a \$6.5 million settlement with Morgan Stanley. It was the product of extensive arm's length negotiations and represents an excellent result for the class.

In addition to the \$6.5 million settlement amount, obviously less the 1.55 million in attorneys' fees and costs, Morgan Stanley has agreed to cooperate with plaintiffs in an ongoing prosecution of this litigation against the non-settling defendants.

The agreed-to cooperation including proffers to counsel regarding the structure of the municipal derivatives industry, as well as Morgan Stanley's participation in the alleged anticompetitive transactions, production of documents that were previously produced to the Department of Justice and any state attorneys general regarding anticompetitive investigations in the municipal derivatives industry.

THE COURT: Ms. Scherrer, let me just interrupt for a moment. I forgot to mention that there are some interested parties who asked to join this conference by telephone and I just want to indicate that they are on now.

Would the parties who are on the phone please identify yourselves so that we have you on the record.

MR. HALL: Yes, Judge. Thank you. This is Chris Hall with the law firm Cook, Hall & Lampros. I represent the State of West Virginia.

MR. STERRETT: Good morning, your Honor. This is

Daniel Sterrett from Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, representing
the City of Los Angeles, et al.

THE COURT: Thank you. And I appreciate your making yourselves available by telephone for this proceeding.

Ms. Scherrer, proceed.

MS. SCHERRER: Yes, your Honor. I was discussing the cooperation that was agreed to under this settlement agreement. This also includes interviews of three current officers or employees of Morgan Stanley.

To date, the plaintiffs have received one proffer and conducted an interview of a Morgan Stanley witness. They've also received the production of nearly 2.5 million documents for review.

As the Court is aware, this settlement was preliminarily approved on January 14, 2011. Notice was issued to class members via direct mail notification and publication notice in July. There are been no objections to the settlement and we've received only 76 requests for exclusion, which is less than 1 percent of the potential settlement class.

As you are aware, the Court must find that the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. Those factors for making this determination were set forth by the Second Circuit in City of Detroit v. Grinnell.

The nine factors are the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation; the reaction of the class to the settlement; the stage of the proceedings and amount of discovery completed; the risks of establishing liability; the risks of establishing damages; the risks of maintaining the class action through trial; the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment; the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of the best possible recovery; and the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of all of the attendant risks of litigation.

With respect to the first factor, the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation, this was a federal antitrust case. These are notoriously complex, protracted, and this case was no different. It was filed in 2008 and involves bid rigging and other anticompetitive activities in the complex municipal derivatives industry.

Demonstrating liability and proving damages against the large number of defendants has already required extensive discovery, including the review of thousands of hours of audio tapes and millions of pages of documents. It has also required the expenditure of substantial monetary resources. Plaintiffs

expect the litigation in this case will continue to require vast resources, particularly given the discovery stays that continue to be requested by the Department of Justice.

With respect to the second factor, the reaction of the class to the settlement, as I mentioned earlier, we have no objectors to this settlement and there are 76 opt-outs out of over 60,000 potential class members that were noticed. The objection deadline was October 11, so we don't expect any more to come in.

The third factor is the stage of proceedings and the amount of discovery completed to date -- I'm sorry -- the amount of discovery completed at the time of settlement. Due to the stays, there was a limited amount of discovery that was completed at the time of settlement. However, clearly, counsel did feel they had sufficient information in order to properly evaluate the risks of settling versus continuing with the litigation.

Additional information obtained through cooperation and through discovery since the settlement was entered into has confirmed that while Morgan Stanley faced some risk of liability, the benefits of settlement outweighed the costs and risks associated with further litigation against Morgan Stanley.

The fourth, fifth, and sixth *Grinnell* factors are the risks of establishing liability and damages and maintaining the

class action through trial. If plaintiffs continue to litigate against Morgan Stanley, they expect that Morgan Stanley would assert defenses at each stage of the litigation, including class certification stage, summary judgment, and at trial, and plaintiffs would face steep monetary costs associated with defending at each stage.

While there are 11 criminal cases involving 19 individual, corporate, and individual defendants, none of these are former or current Morgan Stanley employees. And, additionally, because liability is joint and several under the Sherman Act, there is no risk of the damages -- I'm sorry -- because liability under the Sherman Act is joint and several, the settlement in no way prejudices the ability of the settlement class to recover its full amount of treble damages. Additionally, the settlement secured Morgan Stanley's full cooperation, which is invaluable in the prosecution of this litigation going forward.

Accordingly, the benefits of settlement as discussed earlier outweigh the risks of litigation.

The seventh factor is the ability of Morgan Stanley to withstand a greater judgment. I think everyone agrees that Morgan Stanley is a financial institution that could likely withstand a greater judgment. However, again, plaintiffs believe that the costs and risks associated with further litigation outweigh this factor.

The eighth and ninth factors are the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of the best possible recovery and the attendant risks of litigation. Again, this settlement contains a substantial cash payment of \$6.5 million and cooperation that we think is invaluable in the ongoing litigation. And, again, we think that the risks of further litigation are outweighed by the settlement.

Therefore, we respectfully submit that the settlement should be granted final approval.

THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Scherrer, one question that comes to mind, you mentioned treble damages. As you're undoubtedly aware, the antitrust division brought a criminal case against some of the defendants, some defendants who are involved in the same conduct that you're charging here against Morgan Stanley. That case is scheduled to go to trial in just another month and a half.

Assuming for the moment that the judgment were to be rendered their liability or guilt on the part of the defendants, establishing a record of the conduct that you're alleging here against Morgan Stanley, that judgment would become essentially res judicata as to some of these issues under the Clayton Act. Presumably, some plaintiffs might be able to use it to support litigation against other defendants and conceivably obtain treble damages.

So, how does that weigh in the scheme of things with

the settlement of this case now?

MS. SCHERRER: Well, your Honor, I think plaintiffs feel as if they've done extensive due diligence here with respect to the settlement as to Morgan Stanley and feel that this is a fair settlement as to Morgan Stanley given their participation in the alleged conspiracy, I should say what we believe is their limited participation in the alleged conspiracy.

If for some reason which we don't foresee it comes out at the criminal trial that their participation was greater than expected, as you know, the liability is joint and several and so those transactions would or additional damages would remain available in the case for plaintiffs to pursue against other defendants.

THE COURT: Thank you. Anything else?

MS. SCHERRER: In addition to finding the settlement is fair and reasonable and adequate, your Honor needs to also find that the notice issued by the class comported with due process and meets the requirements of Rule 23(e)(1) and Rule 23(c)(2)(B). I'm happy to go through those factors as well.

THE COURT: Do so briefly just for the record.

MS. SCHERRER: Sure. On June 29, 2011, you approved the form of notice and the comprehensive notice program that provided extensive direct notice to all class members that were

reasonably identifiable and publication notice providing summary notice in national, local, and trade print publications, as well as web-based publications.

On July 11 and 12, 2011, the direct mail notice was sent out to over 60,000 potential settlement class members.

The direct mail notice provided class members with detailed information in plain language about the action and proposed settlement which included the nature of the action and class certified; the claims, issues and defenses; a summary of the monetary terms of the settlement and the plan of allocation; the right of class members to appear through their own attorney; the right to request exclusion and the times and means of doing so; and the binding nature of the judgment, including information about the nature of the class release.

And for your information, a copy of the direct mail notice is attached to the affidavit of Eric Miller which was submitted with our papers.

Notice of settlement was also published in a number of publications which were selected to ensure that decision-makers that purchase municipal derivatives would be reached with notice. Those publications included the Wall Street Journal, the American School Board Journal, the Bond Buyer, the Chronicle of Higher Education, County News, Governing, Healthcare Finance, Municipal Sewer and Water, Nation's Cities Weekly, Public Management, Public Works, State Legislatures,

U.S. Mayor, El Nuevo Dia, El Vocero Pacific Daily News, Primera Hora, Saipan Tribune Samoa News, St. Croix Avis, St. Johns Trade Winds, Virgin Islands Daily News.

The publication notice included abbreviated information regarding the settlement, including the monetary terms, the right of the settlement class members to speak with their own attorney at their own expense, and right to object or opt out of the settlement.

The publication notice also advised class members that they could obtain additional information via a toll-free phone number as well as a website that was set up by the claims administrator, www.MunicipalDerivativesSettlement.com.

Around July 11, Rust, which was the claims administrator, posted a number of the court documents as well as the settlement agreement, the preliminary approval order on that website. The website also contains answers to frequently asked questions.

As of October 31, the website was visited by at least 3,686 -- I should say it was visited 3,686 times and the toll-free information line received 503 calls. As a result of those visits and calls which resulted in inquiries, Rust mailed additional direct mail notices to class members.

Again, we respectfully submit that this notice program complied with due process as well as the requirements of Rule 23.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Ms. Scherrer, you mentioned that there was 70 plus members of the class who essentially opted out.

MS. SCHERRER: Seventy-six, yes.

THE COURT: Seventy-six. Do you represent that each of these 76 followed the procedure in full insofar as having had sufficient notice and filling out whatever appropriate form and giving you and the settlement administrator the proper notice of having complied with all of the procedures?

MS. SCHERRER: Yes, your Honor, we do. As you may have noticed, there was a footnote in our brief when where mentioned the State of Massachusetts and the State of Oregon. The attorneys general for those two states opted out the states, as well as entities of the state for which they claimed to have sole legal authority to represent. We have had some exchange of correspondence with those two attorneys generals in order to get more specific information as to the entities of state that they're opting out. They have not provided any additional information.

At this point we are content to proceed forward. If this becomes an issue during the claims administration process, that's something we can bring to your attention at that stage.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Goldfein.

MR. GOLDFEIN: Good morning, your Honor, and thank

you. I'm Shepard Goldfein from Skadden Arps. We represent

Morgan Stanley. I wanted to answer your question a little bit

differently with regard to the implications of the criminal

matter.

Morgan Stanley has not been named as an unindicted coconspirator in the bill of particulars, as far as we've been able to follow the proceedings in the criminal matters, nor have any of its employees been named as unindicted coconspirators.

In addition, based on the documents that we produced and the proffer that we made to plaintiff's counsel of a witness and his views about the structure of the industry but, more importantly, the underlying facts, I don't believe there's any evidence whatsoever that Morgan Stanley was implicated in any wrongdoing regarding the allegations involved in this case.

I can't speak for the other hundreds, thousands of tapes or other documents plaintiffs have reviewed, obviously, in their files from the other defendants. But I can tell you that Morgan Stanley has not been indicted and not been named in any of the proceedings.

Under the Clayton Act's provisions, I do not believe that any findings that would be made in the criminal case would be admissible as prima facie evidence of guilt against Morgan Stanley or liability in the civil litigation, which is what the statute provides.

So in response to your question, I don't think that there would be any implication as far as I know to date. It would be something that would have to come up during the trial perhaps that could theoretically occur. But based on what I know today, there would be no implications of the criminal matter as to Morgan Stanley.

And settlement was a very hard-negotiated agreement between us and plaintiffs' counsel. It was really a settlement that plaintiffs' counsel was very sensitive in finding and getting to a number that they could justify as fair, reasonable, and adequate to the class.

Morgan Stanley's point of view is it was a settlement that had to take into consideration the potential exposure in any jury trial that can occur. As your Honor knows, things that one might not predict often occur before a jury. But, nevertheless, we took into consideration the legal fee and costs associated with disruption to the business and diversion of management's time to litigation.

So, we earnestly believe this is a fair, reasonable, and adequate settlement. I just wanted to respond to your question that you had asked. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I appreciate that,
Mr. Goldfein. I'm not sure if you may be aware of the scope of
that criminal trial and the information that's before the
Court. The parties have estimated that the amount of discovery

that the government has produced to the defendants in that case exceeds four terabytes of material, which I have seen various estimates translating them to paper documents that exceed hundreds of millions of pieces of paper, audio tapes, conversations, etc. So, one never knows what's in there.

MR. GOLDFEIN: That's my point.

THE COURT: All right. Well, thank you very much.

If there is no one else who wishes to address the Court on this matter, I will declare the hearing closed and the record closed.

Based on the submissions that the parties have made in support of the settlement and the representations made to the Court at this hearing, I am persuaded that the Court can find the factors set forth by the Second Circuit in the *Grinnell* case in favor of an approval of the settlement as fair and reasonable and adequate to the class for all of the reasons set forth on this record, and I will so find and so order in issuing approval in a final judgment today.

Anything else?

MR. GOLDFEIN: Thank you very much, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Have a good day and a good holiday.

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